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1. Introduction We study risk-sensitive nonzero-sum stochastic games on the infinite time
horizon on a countable state space. Risk-sensitive cost criterion plays an important role in many
applications including mathematical finance (see, e.g., Bilelecki and Pliska [8], Nagai [32]). In this
criterion one investigates ‘exponential of integral’ cost which takes into account the attitude of
the controller with respect to risk. The study of this kind of cost criteria was first initiated by
Bellman [6], p. 329 for the finite-state space case. Howard and Matheson [26] did an in-depth
analysis for the first time in the finite-state space case where each controlled chain is irreducible
and aperiodic. Rothblum [33] extended it to the general non-irreducible finite-state space case.
In the past two decades, there has been a renewed interest in this type of cost criteria as, when
the ‘risk factor’ is strictly positive, i.e., in the risk-averse case, the use of the exponential reduces
the possibility of rare but devastating large excursions of the state process. Though this criterion
has been studied extensively in the literature of Markov decision processes (see, e.g., Borkar and
Meyn [13], Cavazos-Cadena and Fernandez-Gaucherand [14], Di Masi and Stettner [15, 16, 17],
Fleming and Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez [21], Fleming and McEneaney [22], Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez and
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Marcus [24], Whittle [35, 36]), the corresponding results on stochastic games seem to be limited
(see e.g., Basar [3], El-Karoui and Hamadene [18], Jacobson [27], James et. al. [28], and, Klomp-
stra [30]). The general Linear-Exponential-Gaussian (LEG) control problem for discrete time with
perfect state observation is treated in Jacobson [27] where an equivalence of this with determin-
istic zero-sum quadratic-cost games was shown. Whereas this paper addresses the undiscounted
case, the corresponding discounted case was addressed by Hansen and Sargent [23]. This was fur-
ther extended to studying the Nash equilibrium for a two-person discrete-time nonzero-sum game
with quadratic-exponential cost criteria in Klompstra [30], the analogue of the Linear-Exponential-
Quadratic-Gaussian (LEQG) control problem studied in Whittle [34, 35]. The papers of Basar [3]
and El-Karoui et. al. [18] deal with stochastic differential games on the finite time horizon. In James
et. al. [28], the finite-horizon risk-sensitive stochastic optimal control problem for discrete-time
nonlinear systems was studied and its relation to a deterministic partially observed dynamic game
was established. To the best of our knowledge, the general case of infinite-horizon risk-sensitive
stochastic zero-sum games for both discounted as well as ergodic cost criteria was first addressed by
the current authors for the differential games setup in Basu and Ghosh [4] and for the discrete-time
countable state space case in Basu and Ghosh [5]. The case of nonzero-sum games in such setups
still remains open. In this work, we address this novel problem and analyze the generic nonzero-
sum case for the discrete-time countable state space setup using totally different mathematical
techniques for its solution as compared to the corresponding zero-sum case. We study this problem
with two players as the analysis can be routinely extended to three or more player case without
introducing any technical novelty but at the cost of further notational complication.
We use the results of Balaji and Meyn [2] to extend the work of Borkar and Meyn [13] from
one-controller case to two-controller case in a fully competitive setup. In other words we study
nonzero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic games on the infinite planning horizon with both discounted
and ergodic cost criteria. We would like to elucidate that both Balaji and Meyn [2] as well as Borkar
and Meyn [13] have obtained the desired results under a “norm-like” or “near-monotone” condition
on the running cost and a Lyapunov-type stability condition. This “norm-like” condition has been
crucially used in the proofs therein as to ensure that the ‘relative value functions’ are bounded from
below. However, for our case, we have performed the analysis without this “norm-like” condition
on the running cost since it would not be suitable for our purpose as it would invariably favour one
of the competing players. This change makes our analysis totally novel and substantially different
from those in the existing literature. Also, in most of the existing literature in this domain see, e.g.,
Balaji and Meyn [2], Borkar and Meyn [13], Cavazos-Cadena and Fernandez-Gaucherand [14], Di
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Masi and Stettner [16], and, Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez and Marcus [24], the ‘risk factor’ is assumed to
be sufficiently small. We make an assumption, for the ergodic game only, on the smallness of the
cost function as in Basu and Ghosh [4] which essentially implies that the ‘risk factor’ cannot be
too large.
Under certain assumptions, we have established the existence of Nash equilibria for both crite-
ria. We obtain our results by studying the corresponding Bellman equations. Note that if player
I announces that he is using a stationary/Markov strategy then for player II the game problem
reduces to a Markov decision problem (MDP). Then by the results of Borkar and Meyn [13], Di
Masi and Stettner [15] and Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez and Marcus [24], player II has optimal station-
ary/Markov strategies. Such a strategy of player II is called an ‘optimal response’ of player II
corresponding to the announced strategy of player I. Optimal responses of player I to the announced
strategies of player II are obtained analogously. Thus, for a given pair of strategies of the two play-
ers, there exists a set of optimal responses. This defines a point-to-set map. Any fixed point of this
map is clearly a Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we establish the existence of such a fixed point
thereby establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for relevant cases. For the sake of notational
simplicity, we consider two-player games only. All our results extends to multi-player games in a
routine manner.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with the description of the problem.
The discounted cost criterion is studied in Section 3. Section 4 deals with the ergodic cost criterion.
We conclude our paper in Section 5 with a summary and possible future directions of work.
2. Problem Description A two-person stochastic game is determined by six objects
(X,U,V, r1, r2, q) where X
def
= {0,1,2, . . .} is a countable state space; U and V are action spaces
of players I and II, resp., assumed to be compact metric spaces; r1(resp. r2) :X ×U × V 7→ R is
the one-stage cost function for player I (resp. II) assumed to be bounded and jointly continuous
in (u, v) ∈ U × V for each k ∈X. Let P(X) be the space of probability measures on X endowed
with the Prohorov topology (see, e.g., Borkar [12]). Let q :X ×U × V 7→ P(X) be the transition
stochastic kernel which is assumed to be jointly continuous in (u, v) ∈ U × V in the topology of
weak convergence for each k ∈X. The game is played is as follows: At each stage (time instant)
players observe the current state k ∈ X of the system and then players I and II independently
choose actions u∈U , v ∈ V , resp. As a result of this, two things happen:
(i) the player I (resp. II) pays an immediate cost r1(k,u, v)(resp. r2(k,u, v)),
(ii) the system moves to a new state k′ ∈X with distribution q(·|k,u, v).
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The whole process then repeats from the new state k′. Cost accumulates throughout the course
of the game. The planning horizon or total number of stages is infinite, and each player wants to
minimize his infinite-horizon multiplicative expected cost to be described shortly. At each stage
the players choose their actions independently on the basis of past information. The available
information for decision making at time t∈N0
def
= {0,1,2 . . .} is given by the history of the process
up to that time
ht
def
= (k0, (u0, v0), k1, (u1, v1), . . . , (ut−1, vt−1), kt)∈Ht,
where H0 = X, Ht = Ht−1 × (U × V × X), . . . ,H∞ = (U × V × X)
∞ are the history spaces. A
strategy for player I is a sequence µ
def
= {µt :Ht 7→ P(U)}t∈N of stochastic kernels. The set of all such
strategies for player I is denoted by Π1. Given any t, T ∈ N0 with T ≥ t+ 1, the set of strategies
{µs :Hs 7→ P(U)}t≤s≤T played from time t to time T is denoted by Π
t,T
1 . Hence, Π
0,∞
1 ≡Π1.
Definition 1. A strategy µ for player I is called a Markov strategy if
µt(ht−1, u, v, k)(·) = µt(h
′
t−1, u
′, v′, k)(·)
for all ht−1, h
′
t−1 ∈Ht−1, u,u
′ ∈U , v, v′ ∈ V , k ∈X, t∈N0. Thus a Markov strategy for player I can
be identified with a sequence of measurable maps, denoted by µ≡ {µt :X 7→ P(U)}t∈N. A Markov
strategy {µt} is called stationary Markov if µt = µ : X 7→ P(U) for all t. A stationary Markov
strategy is called pure or deterministic if µ :X 7→U .
LetM1,S1,D1 denote the set of Markov, stationary Markov and deterministic strategies strate-
gies for player I. The strategy sets Π2,Π
t,T
2 ,M2,S2,D2 for player II are defined analogously. The
spacesMi,Si, i= 1,2 are endowed with the product topologies derived from the Prohorov topology
on the underlying spaces P(U) (resp. P(V )) respectively. Since U,V are compact metric spaces, it
follows thatMi,Si, i= 1,2 are also compact metric spaces. Note that going forward we sometimes
use barbarism of notation and denote a stationary strategy {µ,µ, . . .} as {µ} or only µ when the
context is clear.
Given an initial distribution π0 ∈P(X) and a pair of strategies (µ,ν)∈Π1×Π2, the corresponding
state and action processes {Xt},{Ut},{Vt} are stochastic processes defined on the canonical space
(H∞,B(H∞), P
µ,ν
π0
) (B(H∞) = Borel σ-field on H∞) via the projections Xt(h∞) = kt,Ut(h∞) =
ut, Vt(h∞) = vt, where P
µ,ν
π0
is uniquely determined by µ,ν and π0 by Ionescu Tulcea’s Theorem
(see, e.g., Proposition 7.28 of Bertsekas and Shreve [10]). When π0 = δk, k ∈X, we simply write
P µ,νk .
Let (µ,ν) ∈ Π1 ×Π2 and let (X
(t)
s ,U
(t)
s , V
(t)
s : s ≥ t) be the corresponding process starting from
X
(t)
t = k ∈X for given t≥ 0. We omit the superscript when t= 0 for notational convenience.
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Definition 2. The risk-sensitive discounted cost for player I (i= 1) and II (i= 2) is defined
by
ρµ,νi (θ, (k, t))=
1
θ
lnEµ,νk,t
[
eθ
∑
∞
s=t α
s−tri(X
(t)
s ,U
(t)
s ,V
(t)
s )
]
, (1)
where θ ∈ (0,Θ], Θ> 0 is the ‘risk-sensitive’ parameter, α∈ [0,1] is the ‘discount factor’ and Eµ,νk,t
denotes the expectation with respect to P µ,νk,t . When t= 0, we omit this subscript ‘t’ for notational
convenience. The corresponding risk-sensitive ergodic cost for player i, i= 1,2 is defined by
β
µ,ν
i (θ, k)= limsupT→∞
1
θT
lnEµ,νk
[
eθ
∑T−1
t=0 ri(Xt,Ut,Vs)
]
. (2)
Definition 3. Given a (θ, k) ∈ (0,Θ]×X, a pair of strategies (µ∗, ν∗) ∈ Π1 × Π2 is called a
Nash equilibrium (for the cost criteria above) if
L
µ∗,ν∗
1 (θ, k)≤L
µ,ν∗
1 (θ, k), µ∈Π1,
and
L
µ∗,ν∗
2 (θ, k)≤L
µ∗,ν
2 (θ, k), ν ∈Π2, (3)
where for i= 1,2, Li = ρi or Li = βi as the case may be.
For a given θ ∈ (0,Θ], a pair (µ∗(θ, ·), ν∗(θ, ·)) of stationary/Markov strategies (depending on θ)
is said to be Nash equilibrium strategies if these measurable maps constitute a Nash equilibrium
for any initial k ∈X.
We shall first establish the existence of Nash equilibria in the class of Markov strategies for
cost criterion (1). Under additional ergodicity and smallness of cost conditions, we establish the
existence of Nash equilibria in the class of stationary Markov strategies for cost criterion (2).
Given a topological space Y , we denote by B(Y ) and Cb(Y ) the Banach spaces of bounded
measurable and bounded continuous functions on Y respectively, each equipped with the sup-norm
metric.
The following result established in Section II.3, Chapter II (pp. 25-30) of Borkar [11] plays a cru-
cial role in Sections 3 and 4. Given any set of stochastic process {Y
(1)
t },{Y
(2)
t }, . . . on (H∞,B(H∞))
driven by (µ,ν)∈Π1×Π2 we denote their joint law by L
µ,ν{(Y
(1)
t , Y
(2)
t , . . .), t≥ 0}.
Proposition 1. For a fixed initial distribution π0 ∈ P(X), and given (µ,ν) ∈M1 ×M2, the
map
M1×M2 ∋ (µ,ν) 7→ L
µ,ν{(Xt,Ut, Vt), t≥ 0}
is jointly continuous in (µ,ν), where {Xt, t≥ 0} denotes the state process with initial law π0 and
{Ut, t≥ 0}, {Vt, t≥ 0} are the corresponding control processes.
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3. Discounted Game In this section, we study the cost criterion (1). To this end, we first
consider the risk-sensitive exponential cost criterion for player I (i= 1) and II (i= 2) given by:
ζ
µ,ν
i (θ, (k, t))
def
= eθρ
µ,ν
i
(θ,(k,t))=Eµ,νk,t
[
eθ
∑
∞
s=t α
s−tri(X
(t)
s ,U
(t)
s ,V
(t)
s )
]
, (4)
where {X(t)s : s≥ t} is the state process and {(U
(t)
s , V
(t)
s ) : s≥ t} are the control processes under
(µ,ν)∈Πt,∞1 ×Π
t,∞
2 starting from k ∈X.
Given strategies (µ,ν)∈Πt,∞1 ×Π
t,∞
2 , consider the following Bellman equations for the exponen-
tial cost (4) for players I and II (resp.):
φ1(θ, (k, t))= inf
ξ∈P(U)
[∫
U
∫
V
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
φ1(θα, (j, t+1))q(j|k,u, v)
)
ξ(du)νt[ht](dv)
]
, (5)
with
lim
θ→0
φ1(θ, (k, t))= 1, ∀k ∈X, ∀t, (6)
and
φ2(θ, (k, t))= inf
χ∈P(V )
[∫
U
∫
V
eθr2(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
φ2(θα, (j, t+1))q(j|k,u, v)
)
µt[ht](du)χ(dv))
]
, (7)
with a boundary condition analogous to (6).
Note that under (µ,ν) ∈Πt,∞1 ×Π
t,∞
2 , the corresponding chain {Xt} is inhomogeneous. Hence,
we consider the transformed chain {X˜t} on X ×N0 with the transition kernel q˜ defined by
q˜((k, t′)|(j, t), u, v) = qˆ(k|j, u, v)δt′,t+1, u∈U, v ∈ V, (8)
where δs′,s = 1 if s
′ = s and 0 otherwise. Now, replacing q by q˜ and using the arguments used in
the proof of Proposition 3.1 of Di Masi and Stettner [15], we get the following result. We omit the
routine details.
Proposition 2. Given (µ,ν) ∈ Πt,∞1 ×Π
t,∞
2 , there exist unique bounded solutions φˆ1[ν], φˆ2[µ]
to (5) and (7) (resp.) satisfying the boundary condition (6) such that
φˆ1[ν](θ, (k, t))= inf
µ˜∈Πt,∞1
ζ
µ˜,ν
1 (θ, (k, t)), (9)
and
φˆ2[µ](θ, (k, t))= inf
ν˜∈Π
t,∞
2
ζµ,ν˜2 (θ, (k, t)). (10)
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Moreover, by Remark 3.2 of Di Masi and Stettner [15], given (µ,ν)∈Πt,∞1 ×Π
t,∞
2 and θ ∈ (0,Θ],
the minimizing strategies {µ∗t [ν]}, {ν
∗
t [µ]} in (9) and (10) (resp.) are given by
µ∗t [ν] = µˆ[ν](θα
t, (Xt, t))∈M1 (11)
and
ν∗t [µ] = νˆ[µ](θα
t, (Xt, t))∈M2 (12)
where (µˆ[ν], νˆ[µ]) : (0,Θ]× (X × N0) 7→ P(U) × P(V ) are measurable (minimizing) selectors (see
Benesˇ [9]) such that
inf
ξ∈P(U)
[∫
U
∫
V
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
φˆ1[ν](θα, (j, t+1))q(j|k,u, v)
)
ξ(du)νt[ht](dv)
]
=
∫
U
∫
V
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
φˆ1[ν](θα, (j, t+1))q(j|k,u, v)
)
µˆ[ν](θ, (k, t))(du)νt[ht](dv), (13)
and
inf
χ∈P(V )
[∫
U
∫
V
eθr2(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
φˆ2[µ](θα, (j, t+1))q(j|k,u, v)
)
µt[ht](du)χ(dv)
]
=
∫
U
∫
V
eθr2(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
φˆ2[µ](θα, (j, t+1))q(j|k,u, v)
)
µt[ht](du)νˆ[µ](θ, (k, t))(dv). (14)
Thus, µ∗t [ν] ∈M1 (resp. ν
∗
t [µ] ∈M2) is an optimal response of player I (resp. player II) corre-
sponding to ν ∈Πt,∞2 (resp. µ∈Π
t,∞
1 ). Hence, without loss of generality, we can effectively consider
the strategy pair (µ,ν)∈M1×M2 for further analysis of this game.
Considering the minimizing selectors (µˆ[ν], νˆ[µ]) in (13) and (14) (resp.), we now define the
following point-to-set maps Hi :Mj 7→ 2
Mi , i, j = 1,2, i 6= j as follows:
H1(ν)
def
= {{µ∗t [ν]} : µ
∗
t [ν] satisfies (11)}, (15)
and
H2(µ)
def
= {{ν∗t [µ]} : ν
∗
t [µ] satisfies (12)}. (16)
Define the map H≡H1⊗H2 :M1×M2 7→ 2
M1×M2 as
H(µ,ν)
def
= {({µ∗t [ν]},{ν
∗
t [µ]}) : µ
∗
t [ν] satisfies (11) and ν
∗
t [µ] satisfies (12)}. (17)
We now prove the existence of Nash equilibria in the class of Markov strategies for the exponential
cost criterion (4).
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Theorem 1. Given θ ∈ (0,Θ], there exists a pair of Nash equilibrium strategy in M1×M2 for
the game corresponding to the cost criterion (4).
Proof: Given θ ∈ (0,Θ], (µ,ν) ∈M1 ×M2, both H1(ν) and H2(µ) are non-empty and convex
implying H(µ,ν) is also non-empty and convex. Let {({µ∗t,k[ν]}t,{ν
∗
t,k[µ]}t)}k∈N be a sequence of
distinct points ofH(µ,ν) converging to ({µt,∞[ν]}t,{νt,∞[µ]}t), i.e., ({µt,∞[ν]}t,{νt,∞[µ]}t) is a limit
point of H(µ,ν). Since, for each k ∈ N, µ∗t,k[ν] = µˆk[ν](θα
t, (Xt, t)) and ν
∗
t,k[µ] = νˆk[µ](θα
t, (Xt, t))
satisfy (13) and (14) resp., it follows (by linearity) that so do µt,∞[ν] and νt,∞[µ] resp. implying that
they satisfy (11) and (12) resp. The closure property ofH(µ,ν) thus follows. Hence,H is a map with
non-empty, closed and convex values. Now, by Proposition 1, Lµ,ν{Xt, t≥ 0} is jointly continuous
in (µ,ν) ∈M1 ×M2. Note that φˆ1[ν] as obtained in (9) has a minimizing Markov strategy (11)
and φˆ2[µ] as obtained in (10) has a minimizing Markov strategy (12), i.e., the minimizations in
(9) and (10) can be effectively considered over M1 and M2 (resp.) which are compact sets. Also,
ri, i = 1,2 are bounded functions. Hence, by Berge Maximum Theorem (see Theorem 17.31 of
Aliprantis and Border [7]), φˆ1[ν] and φˆ2[µ] are continuous in ν and µ respectively. Now consider a
sequence {(µk, νk)}k∈N inM1×M2 converging to (µ∞, ν∞) ∈M1×M2. Let H(µk, νk)∋ (µ˜k, ν˜k)→
(µ˜∞, ν˜∞) ∈ M1 ×M2. From the continuity of q(·|·, u, v), φˆ1[ν] and φˆ2[µ] in µ,ν, it follows that
(µ˜∞, ν˜∞) ∈ H(µ∞, ν∞). Hence the map H is upper semi-continuous. Then, by Theorem 1 of Fan
[19], there exists a fixed point (µ∗, ν∗) :N0×X 7→ P(U)×P(V ) of the map H defined as
(µ∗(t, k), ν∗(t, k))
def
= (µˆ[ν∗](θαt, (k, t)), νˆ[µ∗](θαt, (k, t))) (18)
where µˆ[ν∗] (resp. νˆ[µ∗]) is any minimizing selector in (13) (resp. (14)). Then (µ∗, ν∗) ∈M1×M2
is a Nash equilibrium strategy for the cost criterion (4), i.e.,
φˆ1[ν
∗](θ, (k, t))= ζµ
∗,ν∗
1 (θ, (k, t))≤ ζ
µ,ν∗
1 (θ, k), ∀µ∈Π
t,∞
1 ,
and
φˆ2[µ
∗](θ, (k, t))= ζµ
∗,ν∗
2 (θ, (k, t))≤ ζ
µ∗,ν
2 (θ, k), ∀ν ∈Π
t,∞
2 .
✷
Now we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in the class of Markov strategies for the cost
criterion (1).
Given definition (4), the Bellman equations for the discounted cost (1) are:
eθψ1(θ,(k,t))= inf
ξ∈P(U)
[∫
U
∫
V
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
eθαψ1(θα,(j,t+1))q(j|k,u, v)
)
ξ(du)νt[ht](dv)
]
, (19)
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for player 1 with the boundary condition
lim
θ→0
ψ1(θ, (k, t))= inf
µ∈Πt,∞1
E
µ,ν
k,t
[
∞∑
s=t
αs−tr1(X
(t)
s ,U
(t)
s , V
(t)
s )
]
, ∀k ∈X, ∀t, (20)
and
eθψ2(θ,(k,t))= inf
χ∈P(V )
[∫
U
∫
V
eθr2(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
eθαψ2(θα,(j,t+1))q(j|k,u, v)
)
µt[ht](du)χ(dv)
]
, (21)
for player 2 with the boundary condition
lim
θ→0
ψ2(θ, (k, t))= inf
ν∈Π
t,∞
2
E
µ,ν
k,t
[
∞∑
s=t
αs−tr2(X
(t)
s ,U
(t)
s , V
(t)
s )
]
, ∀k ∈X, ∀t. (22)
Theorem 2. Given θ ∈ (0,Θ], consider the fixed point Markov strategies (µ∗, ν∗) of H as in
(18) in Theorem 1. Then (µ∗, ν∗) is also a pair of Nash equilibrium strategy for the cost criterion
(1), i.e.,
ψˆ1[ν
∗](θ, (k, t))= ρµ
∗,ν∗
1 (θ, (k, t))≤ ρ
µ,ν∗
1 (θ, (k, t)), ∀µ∈Π
t,∞
1 ,
and
ψˆ2[µ
∗](θ, (k, t))= ρµ
∗,ν∗
2 (θ, (k, t))≤ ρ
µ∗,ν
2 (θ, (k, t)), ∀ν ∈Π
t,∞
2 ,
where ψˆ1[ν
∗] and ψˆ2[µ
∗] are unique bounded solutions to (19) and (21) (resp.) satisfying the bound-
ary conditions (20) and (22) respectively.
Proof: The result follows directly from (4), Proposition 2, Theorem 1 and the fact that log is an
increasing function. ✷
4. Ergodic Game In this section, we study the cost criterion (2). To this end, we make the
following assumption:
(A1) The process {Xt}t∈N0 is an irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain under any pair of stationary
Markov strategies (µ,ν)∈ S1×S2.
We also assume the following condition which guarantees uniform ergodicity of controlled Markov
processes and is used to study additive average cost problems (see, e.g., Herna´ndez-Lerma [25],
Section 3.3 or an equivalent assumption (A1) in Di Masi and Stettner [15] or (3.2) in Herna´ndez-
Herna´ndez and Marcus [24]):
(A2) There exists a number 0< δ < 1 such that for all i, j ∈X, u,u′ ∈U and v, v′ ∈ V ,
||q(·|i, u, v)− q(·|j, u′, v′)||TV ≤ 2δ,
where || · ||TV denotes the total variation norm (see, e.g., Herna´ndez-Lerma [25], Appendix B).
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In our further analysis of this problem, the above assumptions always hold.
Under (A1)-(A2), it follows from the Lemma 3.3 of Herna´ndez-Lerma [25] that for any (µ,ν)∈
S1×S2, the corresponding Markov chain {Xt} is uniformly ergodic with a unique invariant prob-
ability measure η[µ,ν] ∈P(X), i.e.,
||qˆt(·|k,µ, ν)− η[µ,ν](·)||TV ≤ 2δ
t, ∀k ∈X, ∀t∈N, (23)
where qˆt(·|k,µ, ν) denotes the t-step transition kernel under (µ,ν) starting from k ∈X.
Remark 1. It is important to note here that the quantity δ on the r.h.s. of the above inequality
(23) is independent of the strategy pair (µ,ν) and (23) holds uniformly across all (µ,ν)∈ S1×S2 (see
also condition C4 of Theorem 4(ii) in Federgruen et. al. [20]). Note that an assumption equivalent
to (A2) was also necessary for the corresponding zero-sum case as analyzed in Basu and Ghosh
[5]. Equivalent assumptions are quite common in the corresponding literature for the one-controller
case (see, e.g., Di Masi and Stettner [15],[16] and [17], Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez and Marcus [24]).
Definition 4. For any B ⊆X, define the hitting time of the set B by {Xt} as
τB
def
= inf{t≥ 0 :Xt ∈B}. (24)
Denote τB = τj if B = {j}. Similarly, define the first return time to B by {Xt} as
σB
def
= inf{t≥ 1 :Xt ∈B}. (25)
Denote σB = σj if B = {j}.
Now, Theorem 2.1 of Balaji and Meyn [2], Theorem 16.0.2 of Meyn and Tweedie [31] and Remark
1 together imply the following result:
Proposition 3. Assume (A1)-(A2). Then the following three equivalent statements hold.
(a) For every A ∈ 2X , the chain {Xt} is geometrically recurrent uniformly over all (µ,ν) ∈
S1 × S2, i.e., there exists some RA > 1 such that sup(µ,ν)∈S1×S2 supk∈X E
µ,ν
k [R
σA
A ] ≤ BA <∞. In
particular, if A = {j}, j ∈X we write the constants above as Rj and Bj respectively. Note that
BA,Bj > 1 by definition.
(b) For every A ∈ 2X , there exists some LA > 0 such that sup(µ,ν)∈S1×S2 supk∈X E
µ,ν
k [σA]≤LA <
∞. In particular, if A= {j}, j ∈X we write the constant above as Lj.
(c) There exist η < 1, b <∞, a finite subset C ⊂X and a bounded function V :X→ [1,∞) such
that ∑
j
V (j)q(j|i, µ(i), ν(i))≤ ηV (i)+ bIC(i)
where η, b,C and V are all independent of (µ,ν)∈ S1×S2.
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Remark 2. Note that stochastic Lyapunov-type stability assumptions as in Proposition 3(c)
was also necessary for the corresponding zero-sum stochastic differential game case as analyzed
in Basu and Ghosh [4]. See also Remark 1 for reference to the corresponding literature where
equivalent assumptions are used. We also refer the reader to Altman et. al. [1] for examples of such
games on countable spaces with additive cost criteria where equivalent stability assumptions were
made.
Henceforth we fix θ ∈ (0,Θ]. Given strategies (µ,ν) ∈ Π1 ×Π2, consider the following dynamic
programming (HJB) equations for the ergodic cost (2) for players I and II (resp.):
eθλ1+V1(θ,k) = inf
ξ∈P(U)
[∫
U
∫
V
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
eV1(θ,j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
ξ(du)νt[ht](dv)
]
, (26)
and
eθλ2+V2(θ,k) = inf
χ∈P(V )
[∫
U
∫
V
eθr2(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
eV2(θ,j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
µt[ht](du)χ(dv)
]
, (27)
where λ1, λ2 are scalars.
Under (A1)-(A2), by Corollary 2.3 of Di Masi and Stettner [15], there exists at most one (up
to an additive constant) bounded function Vˆ1[ν] and a unique constant λˆ1[ν] for which (26) is
satisfied. If it does then, by Proposition 1.1 of Di Masi and Stettner [15] (see also Theorem 2.1 of
Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez and Marcus [24]), we have
λˆ1[ν] = inf
µ∈Π1
βµ,ν1 (θ, k) = inf
µ∈S1
limsupT→∞
1
θT
lnEµ,νk
[
eθ
∑T−1
t=0 r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)
]
(28)
and similarly, there exists at most one bounded Vˆ2[µ] (modulo an additive constant) and a unique
λˆ2[µ] satisfying (27) such that
λˆ2[µ] = inf
ν∈Π2
β
µ,ν
2 (θ, k)= inf
ν∈S2
limsupT→∞
1
θT
lnEµ,νk
[
eθ
∑T−1
t=0 r2(Xt,Ut,Vt)
]
. (29)
Hence there exist measurable (minimizing) selectors (see Benesˇ [9])
(µˆ[ν], νˆ[µ]) :X 7→ P(U)×P(V )
satisfying
inf
ξ∈P(U)
[∫
U
∫
V
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
eVˆ1[ν](θ,j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
ξ(du)νt[ht](dv)
]
=
∫
U
∫
V
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
eVˆ1[ν](θ,j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
µˆ[ν] [du|k]νt[ht](dv), (30)
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and
inf
χ∈P(V )
[∫
U
∫
V
eθr2(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
eVˆ2[µ](θ,j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
µt[ht](du)χ(dv)
]
=
∫
U
∫
V
eθr2(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
eVˆ2[µ](θ,j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
µt[ht](du)νˆ[µ] [dv|k] . (31)
Hence, by Proposition 1.1 of Di Masi and Stettner [15] (see also Theorem 2.1 of Herna´ndez-
Herna´ndez and Marcus [24]), given (µ,ν) ∈Π1 ×Π2, if there exist bounded solutions to (26) and
(27) then the minimizing selector µˆ[ν] and νˆ[µ] in (30) and (31) resp. generates stationary (see (28)
and (29)) optimal response strategy of player I (resp. player II) when the other’s strategy fixed.
Hence, without loss of generality, we can effectively consider the strategy pairs (µ,ν)∈ S1×S2 for
further analysis of this game. Thus if we consider the minimizing selectors µˆ[ν] and νˆ[µ] in (30)
and (31) respectively, we can define the following point-to-set maps Hi : Sj 7→ 2
Si , i, j = 1,2, i 6= j
as follows:
H1(ν)
def
= {{µ∗[ν]} : µ∗[ν] satisfies (30)}, (32)
and
H2(µ)
def
= {{ν∗[µ]} : ν∗[µ] satisfies (31)}. (33)
Define the map H≡H1⊗H2 : S1×S2 7→ 2
S1×S2 as
H(µ,ν)
def
= {({µ∗[ν]},{ν∗[µ]}) : µ∗[ν] satisfies (30) and ν∗[µ] satisfies (31)}. (34)
A priori, it is not clear that the sets H1,H2 and hence H are nonempty. We now proceed to prove
the existence of unique bounded solutions to (26) and (27). Once this result is established, the
nonemptyness of the above sets follow automatically. Then, using arguments similar to Theorem
1, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria by showing that the map H has a fixed point (µ˜, ν˜). To
this end, we make the following definitions (see Balaji and Meyn [2] and Borkar and Meyn [13]).
Definition 5. Given an arbitrarily fixed state 0∈X and any strategy (µ,ν)∈ S1×S2, let
Λ1[ν](µ)
def
= inf
{
Λ∈R :Eµ,ν0
[
eθ
∑σ0−1
t=0 (r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ)
]
≤ 1
}
, (35)
and
Λ2[µ](ν)
def
= inf
{
Λ∈R :Eµ,ν0
[
eθ
∑σ0−1
t=0 (r2(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ)
]
≤ 1
}
. (36)
Also define
Λ∗1[ν]
def
= inf
µ∈S1
Λ1[ν](µ), (37)
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h∗1[ν](k)
def
= inf
µ∈S1
Eµ,νk
[
eθ
∑τ0
t=0(r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ
∗
1[ν])
]
, (38)
w∗1 [ν](k)
def
= argminξ∈P(U)
[∫
U
∫
V
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
h∗1[ν](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
ξ(du)ν [dv|k]
]
, (39)
where w∗1 [ν] is any minimizer in (39). Similarly, let
Λ∗2[µ]
def
= inf
ν∈S2
Λ2[µ](ν), (40)
h∗2[µ](k)
def
= inf
ν∈S2
Eµ,νk
[
eθ
∑τ0
t=0(r2(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ
∗
2[µ])
]
, (41)
w∗2 [µ](k)
def
= argminχ∈P(V )
[∫
U
∫
V
eθr2(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
h∗2[µ](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
µ [du|k]χ(dv)
]
(42)
where w∗2 [µ] is any minimizer in (42).
Note that since θ is fixed we have suppressed the explicit dependence on θ in these definitions
for notational convenience. A priori, it is not obvious that the quantities defined above are finite.
The following Proposition 4 and Lemmata 1 and 2 settle this issue.
First, we make a “small cost” assumption which shall hold for the rest of this paper.
(A3) ||ri||∞ ≤
lnR0
3Θ
, i= 1,2,
where R0 > 1 is as in part (a) of Proposition 3.
Remark 3. Note that a similar assumption was also necessary for the corresponding zero-sum
stochastic differential game case as analyzed in Basu and Ghosh [4].
Now we state and prove the following important proposition.
Proposition 4. Under (A1)-(A3) and for any (µ,ν)∈ S1×S2,
||r1||∞ ≥ |Λ
∗
1[ν]|, (43)
and
||r2||∞ ≥ |Λ
∗
2[µ]|. (44)
Moreover, Λ∗1[ν] (resp. Λ
∗
2[µ]) is continuous in ν (resp. µ).
Proof: We prove it for player I. The result for player II follows analogously. From (35) we obtain,
by Jensen’s inequality
1 ≥Eµ,ν0
[
eθ
∑σ0−1
t=0 (r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ1[ν](µ))
]
≥ e−θΛ1[ν](µ)E
µ,ν
0 [σ0]e
θE
µ,ν
0
[∑σ0−1
t=0 (r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)
]
≥ e−θΛ1[ν](µ)E
µ,ν
0 [σ0]e−θ||r1||∞E
µ,ν
0 [σ0]
which implies
eθ||r1||∞E
µ,ν
0 [σ0] ≥ e−θΛ1[ν](µ)E
µ,ν
0 [σ0].
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Under (A1)-(A2), 0<Eµ,ν0 [σ0]≤L0 <∞ (see part (b) of Proposition 3) and hence, by taking log
on both sides of the last inequality, we get
−||r1||∞ ≤Λ1[ν](µ).
Now, by (35), for any ǫ > 0, we have
Eµ,ν0
[
eθ
∑σ0−1
t=0 (r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ1[ν](µ)+ǫ)
]
> 1
implying
E
µ,ν
0
[
eθ
∑σ0−1
t=0 (||r1||∞−Λ1[ν](µ)+ǫ)
]
> 1
which, in turn, implies
Eµ,ν0
[
eθ(||r1||∞−Λ1[ν](µ)+ǫ)σ0
]
> 1.
Since this is true for any ǫ > 0, we have in the limit ǫ ↓ 0,
E
µ,ν
0
[
eθ(||r1||∞−Λ1[ν](µ))σ0
]
≥ 1
implying
||r1||∞−Λ1[ν](µ)≥ 0.
Hence we have
− ||r1||∞ ≤Λ1[ν](µ)≤ ||r1||∞. (45)
The inequality (43) follows by taking the inf over µ ∈ S1. We now prove the joint continuity in
(µ,ν) of Λ1[ν](µ). Consider a sequence {(µ
(n), ν(n))}
n→∞
−→ (µ(∞), ν(∞)) in S1 × S2. Let {Xt, t ≥ 0}
denote the chain starting at 0. By Proposition 1,
Lµ
(n),ν(n){Xt, t≥ 0}
n→∞
−→ Lµ
(∞),ν(∞){Xt, t≥ 0}.
Then, by Skorohod’s Theorem (see Theorem 2.2.2 of Borkar [12]), there exists some augmentation
(H˜∞,B(H˜∞), P˜) of the canonical space (H∞,B(H∞)) on which
{Xµ
(n),ν(n)
t , t≥ 0}
P˜-a.s
−→ {Xµ
(∞),ν(∞)
t , t≥ 0}
where {Xµ
(n) ,ν(n)
t , t ≥ 0}, n = 1,2, . . . ,∞ denotes the Markov chain under (µ
(n), ν(n)) on this aug-
mented space starting at 0. Following (25), let σ
(n)
0
def
= inf{t ≥ 1 :Xµ
(n),ν(n)
t = 0}, n = 1,2, . . . ,∞.
Then, obviously P˜ -a.s.
σ
(n)
0
n→∞
−→ σ(∞)0 .
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Hence we get the joint continuity under (µ,ν) of σ0. Hence, for any 0 < ǫ ≤ ||r1||∞ and along
a subsequence {nk} ⊂ {n} with {(µ
(nk), ν(nk))}
nk→∞−→ (µ(∞), ν(∞)), we have by (45) and the joint
continuity of σ0 under (µ,ν)
fnk ≡ e
θ
∑σ(nk)0 −1
t=0
(
r1(X
µ(nk),ν(nk)
t ,U
µ(nk),ν(nk)
t ,V
µ(nk),ν(nk)
t )−Λ1[ν
(nk)](µ(nk))+ǫ
)
P˜-a.s.
−→ e
θ
∑σ(∞)0 −1
t=0
(
r1(X
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t ,U
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t ,V
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t )−Λ+ǫ
)
≡ f∞, (46)
where |Λ| ≤ ||r1||∞ and U
µ(n),ν(n)
t , V
µ(n),ν(n)
t are the corresponding control sequences under
(µ(n), ν(n)), n= 1,2, . . . ,∞ on this augmented space. Then
0<fnk = |fnk | ≤ gnk
def
= eθ(2||r1||∞+ǫ)σ
(nk)
0
P˜ -a.s.
−→ eθ(2||r1||∞+ǫ)σ
(∞)
0
def
= g∞ ≥ |f∞|= f∞. (47)
Moreover, by (A3) and part (a) of Proposition 3, we have
sup
nk
E˜
[
gnk
]
≤ sup
nk
E˜
[
e3Θ||r1||∞σ
(nk)
0
]
≤ sup
nk
E˜
[
R
σ
(nk)
0
0
]
≤B0 <∞, (48)
which, in particular, implies that {σ
(nk)
0 } are uniformly integrable. Given any ε > 0 it follows from
(48) that there exists some large enough constant K ≡K(ε,B0)> 0 such that
sup
nk
E˜
[
gnkI{gnk≥K}
]
≤ ε (49)
implying {gnk} are uniformly integrable.
It follows by Theorem 6.18(iii) of Klenke [29] and (47) that {fnk} is uniformly integrable.
Also, by (A3) and part (a) of Proposition 3, we have
E˜ [g∞]≤ E˜
[
e3Θ||r1||∞σ
(∞)
0
]
≤ E˜
[
R
σ
(∞)
0
0
]
≤B0 <∞. (50)
Hence, by Corollary 1.3.1 of Borkar [12], we get
lim
nk→∞
E˜

eθ∑σ
(nk)
0
−1
t=0
(
r1(X
µ(nk),ν(nk)
t ,U
µ(nk),ν(nk)
t ,V
µ(nk),ν(nk)
t )−Λ1[ν
(nk)](µ(nk))+ǫ
)
= E˜

eθ∑σ
(∞)
0
−1
t=0
(
r1(X
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t ,U
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t ,V
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t )−Λ+ǫ
) . (51)
Similarly we can show that
lim
nk→∞
E˜

eθ∑σ
(nk)
0 −1
t=0
(
r1(X
µ(nk),ν(nk)
t ,U
µ(nk),ν(nk)
t ,V
µ(nk),ν(nk)
t )−Λ1[ν
(nk)](µ(nk))
)
= E˜

eθ∑σ
(∞)
0
−1
t=0
(
r1(X
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t ,U
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t ,V
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t )−Λ
) . (52)
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Now from (35) we get that for any 0< ǫ≤ ||r1||∞,
E˜

eθ∑σ
(n)
0
−1
t=0
(
r1(X
µ(n),ν(n)
t ,U
µ(n),ν(n)
t ,V
µ(n),ν(n)
t )−Λ1[ν
(n)](µ(n))+ǫ
)≥ 1
≥ E˜

eθ∑σ
(n)
0
−1
t=0
(
r1(X
µ(n),ν(n)
t ,U
µ(n),ν(n)
t ,V
µ(n),ν(n)
t )−Λ1[ν
(n)](µ(n))
) . (53)
Hence, taking limnk→∞ on both sides of (53), we have by (52) and (53)
E˜

eθ∑σ
(∞)
0
−1
t=0
(
r1(X
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t ,U
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t ,V
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t )−Λ+ǫ
)≥ 1
≥ E˜

eθ∑σ
(∞)
0
−1
t=0
(
r1(X
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t ,U
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t ,V
µ(∞),ν(∞)
t )−Λ
) , (54)
for some Λ satisfying (45) and all 0< ǫ≤ ||r1||∞. This implies, by (35), that Λ = Λ1[ν
(∞)](µ(∞)).
Hence Λ1[ν](µ) is jointly continuous under (µ,ν). The continuity of Λ
∗
1[ν] with respect to ν now
follows from (45) since S1 is compact. ✷
Remark 4. Note that by (45) above the quantities Λ1[ν](µ) and Λ2[µ](ν) defined in (35) and
(36) respectively are uniformly bounded for all θ ∈ (0,Θ]. This fact shall be implicitly used in the
proof of Theorem 3.
Now we state and prove two useful lemmata.
Lemma 1. Under (A1)-(A2) and for any (µ,ν)∈ S1×S2,
1. The multiplicative Poisson inequalities holds for all k ∈X, i.e.,
∫
U
∫
V
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
h∗1[ν](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
w∗1 [ν](k)(du)ν [dv|k]≤ e
θΛ∗1[ν]h∗1[ν](k), (55)
∫
U
∫
V
eθr2(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
h∗2[µ](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
µ [du|k]w∗2 [µ](k)(dv)≤ e
θΛ∗2[µ]h∗2[µ](k). (56)
2. h∗1[ν](k)<∞, h
∗
2[µ](k)<∞, ∀k ∈X.
Proof: We prove it for player I when player II uses ν ∈ S2. The other case is analogous. For each
k 6= 0,
e−θΛ
∗
1[ν]
∫
V
∫
U
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
h∗1[ν](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
w∗1 [ν](k)(du)ν [dv|k] =
inf
ξ∈P(U)
∫
V
∫
U
eθ(r1(k,u,v)−Λ
∗
1 [ν])
(∑
j∈X
q(j|k,u, v)
{
inf
µ∈S1
Eµ,νj
[
eθ
∑τ0−1
t=0 (r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ
∗
1 [ν])
]})
ξ(du)ν [dv|k]
= h∗1[ν](k) (by one-step backward recursion),
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while for k= 0, we have
∫
V
∫
U
(∑
j∈X
h∗1[ν](j)q(j|0, u, v)
)
w∗1 [ν](0)(du)ν [dv|0] = inf
µ∈S1
Eµ,ν0
[
eθ
∑σ0−1
t=0 (r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ
∗
1[ν])
]
≤ 1,
(57)
where the inequality follows from (35). It follows that (55) holds. From (55) it follows exactly as in
the proof of Lemma 15.2.2(i) of Meyn and Tweedie [31] that the set S
def
= {k ∈X : h∗1[ν](k)<∞}
absorbing, i.e.,
∑
j∈S
∫
V
∫
U
q(j|k,u, v)w∗1[ν](k)(du)ν [dv|k] = 1 for all k ∈ S. Since it is non-empty
as 0 ∈ S and the chain {Xt} is irreducible under the stationary strategy (w
∗
1 [ν], ν) by assumption
(A1), we get by Proposition 4.2.3 of Meyn and Tweedie [31] that it is full, i.e. S =X establishing
part 2. ✷
Note that, under the additional assumption (A3), we can actually show a tighter result than
part 2 of Lemma 1 as given below.
Lemma 2. Under (A1) - (A3) and for any (µ,ν)∈ S1×S2,
1
R0B0
≤ h∗1[ν](k)≤R0B0,
1
R0B0
≤ h∗2[µ](k)≤R0B0, ∀k ∈X. (58)
Moreover, h∗1[ν](k) (resp. h
∗
2[µ](k)) is continuous in ν (resp. µ) for all k ∈X.
Proof: We prove it for h∗1[ν]. The proof is exactly similar for h
∗
2[µ]. Under the assumptions of this
lemma, we have by (38) and part (a) of Proposition 3
0 <Eµ,νk
[
eθ
∑τ0
t=0(r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ
∗
1[ν])
]
=Eµ,νk
[
eθ
∑σ0
t=0(r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ
∗
1[ν])
]
≤Eµ,νk
[
e2θ||r1||∞(σ0+1)
]
≤Eµ,νk
[
e3Θ||r1||∞(σ0+1)
]
≤R0 sup
k∈X
Eµ,νk [R
σ0
0 ]≤R0B0, ∀k 6=0, (59)
where the equality follows from Proposition 3.4.5(ii) of Meyn and Tweedie [31]. Hence we get
0<h∗1[ν](k) = inf
µ˜∈S1
E
µ˜,ν
k
[
eθ
∑τ0
t=0(r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ
∗
1[ν])
]
≤R0B0, ∀k 6= 0. (60)
Let µ˜[ν] ∈ S1 be any minimizer in (38). Such a minimizer always exists by (59), Proposition 1
and the compactness of S1. Hence, for all k 6=0, we have using Jensen’s inequality and part (a) of
Proposition 3
h∗1[ν](k) =E
µ˜[ν],ν
k
[
eθ
∑τ0
t=0(r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ
∗
1[ν])
]
=E
µ˜[ν],ν
k
[
eθ
∑σ0
t=0(r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ
∗
1 [ν])
]
≥E
µ˜[ν],ν
k
[
e−2θ||r1||∞(σ0+1)
]
≥E
µ˜[ν],ν
k
[
e−3Θ||r1||∞(σ0+1)
]
≥
1
R0
E
µ˜[ν],ν
k
[
1
R
σ0
0
]
≥
1
R
E
µ˜[ν],ν
k
[σ0]+1
0
≥
1
R0E
µ˜[ν],ν
k [R
σ0
0 ]
≥
1
R0 supj∈X E
µ˜[ν],ν
j [R
σ0
0 ]
≥
1
R0B0
. (61)
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Note that h∗1[ν](0) = infξ∈P(U)
∫
V
∫
U
eθr1(0,u,v)−θΛ
∗
1[ν]ξ(du)ν [dv|0] obviously obeys the bound. The
joint continuity of Eµ,νk
[
eθ
∑τ0
t=0(r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ
∗
1 [ν])
]
under (µ,ν) can be proved as in the proof of
Proposition 4. Hence the continuity of h∗1[ν] in ν follows from (59) and the compactness of S1. ✷
Now we state and prove following theorem which is a key step for proving the existence of Nash
equilibria.
Theorem 3. Under (A1) - (A3) and for (µ,ν) ∈ S1 × S2, (lnh
∗
1[ν], λˆ1[ν]) with h
∗
1[ν](0) =∫
V
∫
U
eθr1(0,u,v)−θΛ
∗
1[ν]w∗1 [ν](0)(du)ν [dv|0], where w
∗
1 [ν] is defined in (39), is the unique solution in
B(X)×R+ to (26). Similarly, (lnh
∗
2[µ], λˆ2[µ]) with h
∗
2[µ](0) =
∫
U
∫
V
eθr2(0,u,v)−θΛ
∗
2[µ]µ [du|0]w∗2 [µ](0)(dv),
where w∗2 [µ] is defined in (42), is the unique solution to (27) again in B(X)×R+.
Proof: We shall prove this for player I when player II plays the strategy ν. The other case is
proved analogously. We first prove that (lnh∗1[ν], λˆ1[ν]) is a solution to (26). By Lemma 1, h
∗
1[ν] as
defined in (38) is finite. Consider w∗1 [ν] defined in (39) with this h
∗
1[ν]. Let
f ∗1 [ν](k)
def
= E
w∗1 [ν],ν
k
[
eθ
∑τ0
t=0(r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ1[ν](w
∗
1 [ν]))
]
(62)
under the stationary strategy w∗1 [ν]. Note that, for k 6=0, we can get as in (60) of Lemma 2,
0< f ∗1 [ν](k)≤R0B0 <∞. (63)
It follows from the Markov property that
∫
V
∫
U
(∑
j∈X
f ∗1 [ν](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
w∗1 [ν](k)(du)ν [dv|k] =E
w∗1 [ν],ν
k
[
eθ
∑σ0
t=1(r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ1[ν](w
∗
1 [ν]))
]
=
∫
V
∫
U
e−θr1(k,u,v)+θΛ1[ν](w
∗
1 [ν])f ∗1 [ν](k)w
∗
1[ν](k)(du)ν [dv|k] , k 6= 0. (64)
Since, f ∗1 [ν](0) =
∫
V
∫
U
eθr1(0,u,v)−θΛ1[ν](w
∗
1 [ν])w∗1 [ν](0)(du)ν [dv|0], it follows that the following multi-
plicative Poisson equation holds:
∫
V
∫
U
(∑
j∈X
f ∗1 [ν](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
w∗1 [ν](k)(du)ν [dv|k]
=
∫
V
∫
U
e−θr1(k,u,v)+θΛ1[ν](w
∗
1 [ν])f ∗1 [ν](k)w
∗
1[ν](k)(du)ν [dv|k] ,∀k. (65)
Since by (45) in Proposition 4 Λ1[ν]({w
∗
1 [ν]})<∞ and by (63) 0< f
∗
1 [ν](k)<∞, under the tran-
sition kernel q(·|k,u, v), we can define the “twisted kernel” q˘1(·|k,w
∗
1[ν](k), ν(k)) as follows:
q˘1(j|k,w
∗
1[ν](k), ν(k))
def
=
∫
U
∫
V
eθr1(k,u,v)−θΛ1[ν](w
∗
1 [ν])
f ∗1 [ν](k)
f ∗1 [ν](j)q(j|k,u, v)w
∗
1[ν](k)(du)ν [dv|k] , j ∈X.
(66)
Basu and Ghosh: Nonzero-sum Risk-sensitive Games with Countable States
Article submitted to Mathematics of Operations Research; manuscript no. MOR-2015-241 19
Note that the kernel q˘1 is indeed stochastic i.e.,
∑
j∈X q˘1(j|k,w
∗
1[ν](k), ν(k)) = 1, ∀k since (65)
holds. Hence, q˘1 is the transition kernel for some Markov chain {X˘t}. Since, by (45), for any
−||r1||∞ ≤Λ<Λ1[ν](w
∗
1 [ν]),
0<E
w∗1 [ν],ν
0
[
eθ
∑σ0−1
t=0 (r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−Λ)
]
≤E
w∗1 [ν],ν
0
[
e3Θ||r1||∞σ0
]
≤ sup
k∈X
E
w∗1 [ν],ν
k [R
σ0
0 ]≤B0 <∞,
it follows from Theorem 4.1(i)-(ii) of Balaji and Meyn [2] that the chain {X˘t} under q˘1 is
geometrically recurrent. Hence it follows from Theorem 4.2(i) of Balaji and Meyn [2] that
(f ∗1 [ν],Λ1[ν]({w
∗
1 [ν]})) is a solution to the multiplicative Poisson equation:
eθλψ(k) =
∫
U
∫
V
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
ψ(j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
w∗1 [ν](k)(du)ν [dv|k] . (67)
It follows from (39), the fact that h∗1[ν]> 0 by definition and (55) in Lemma 1 that, for all k ∈X,
inf
ξ∈P(U)
∫
V
∫
U
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
h∗1[ν](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
ξ(du)ν [dv|k]
=
∫
V
∫
U
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
h∗1[ν](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
w∗1 [ν](k)(du)ν [dv|k]
≤ eθΛ
∗
1[ν]h∗1[ν](k)≤ e
θΛ1[ν](w
∗
1 [ν])h∗1[ν](k), (68)
as Λ∗1[ν]≤ Λ1[ν](w
∗
1 [ν]) (see (35) and (37)). Hence, by Theorem 4.2(i)-(ii) of Balaji and Meyn [2],
we obtain
h∗1[ν](k)
h∗1[ν](0)
=
f ∗1 [ν](k)
f ∗1 [ν](0)
, (69)
and
inf
ξ∈P(U)
∫
U
∫
V
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
h∗1[ν](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
ξ(du)ν [dv|k]
= eθΛ
∗
1[ν]h∗1[ν](k) = e
θΛ1[ν](w
∗
1 [ν])h∗1[ν](k), ∀k ∈X. (70)
Hence Λ∗1[ν] = Λ1[ν](w
∗
1 [ν]). Since, by Lemma 2, 0 < supk∈X | lnh
∗
1[ν](k)| ≤ ln(R0B0) <∞ as by
definition both R0,B0 > 1, uniqueness follows from Corollary 2.3 of Di Masi and Stettner [15]
and the condition h∗1[ν](0) = f
∗
1 [ν](0) = infξ∈P(U)
∫
U
∫
V
eθr1(0,u,v)−θΛ
∗
1[ν]ξ(du)ν [dv|0]. It follows from
Proposition 1.1 of Di Masi and Stettner [15] (see also Theorem 2.1 of Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez and
Marcus [24]) that
Λ∗1[ν] = λˆ1[ν] (71)
and hence,
h∗1[ν](k) =E
{w∗1 [ν]},ν
k
[
eθ
∑τ0
t=0(r1(Xt,Ut,Vt)−λˆ1[ν])
]
,∀k ∈X. (72)
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Similarly, it can be shown for player II that
Λ∗2[µ] = λˆ2[µ] (73)
and
h∗2[µ](k) =E
µ,{w∗2 [µ]}
k
[
eθ
∑τ0
t=0(r2(Xt,Ut,Vt)−λˆ2[µ])
]
,∀k ∈X, (74)
under the stationary strategy w∗2 [µ] as defined in (42) with h
∗
2[µ] as defined in (41). ✷
Hence, by (30) and (31), for any (µ,ν)∈ S1×S2, there exists measurable (minimizing) selectors
(see Benesˇ [9])
(µˆ[ν], νˆ[µ]) :X 7→ P(U)×P(V )
satisfying
inf
ξ∈P(U)
∫
V
∫
U
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
elnh
∗
1[ν](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
ξ(du)ν [dv|k]
=
∫
V
∫
U
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
elnh
∗
1[ν](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
µˆ[ν](k)(du)ν [dv|k] , (75)
implying, by Theorem 3 and (26),
eθλˆ1[ν]+lnh
∗
1[ν](k) =
∫
V
∫
U
eθr1(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
elnh
∗
1[ν](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
µˆ[ν](k)(du)ν [dv|k] , (76)
and similarly
inf
χ∈P(V )
∫
U
∫
V
eθr2(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
elnh
∗
2[µ](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
µ [du|k]χ(dv)
=
∫
U
∫
V
eθr2(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
elnh
∗
2[µ](j)
)
q(j|k,u, v)µ [du|k] νˆ[µ](k)(dv), (77)
implying, by Theorem 3 and (27),
eθλˆ2[µ]+lnh
∗
2[µ](k) =
∫
U
∫
V
eθr2(k,u,v)
(∑
j∈X
elnh
∗
2[µ](j)q(j|k,u, v)
)
µ [du|k] νˆ[µ](k)(dv). (78)
Using the minimizing selectors µˆ[ν] and νˆ[µ] in (75) and (77) as our optimal responses for given
(µ,ν) ∈ S1 ×S2, we now prove the existence of Nash equilibria in the class of stationary Markov
strategies for the ergodic cost criterion (2).
Theorem 4. Given θ ∈ (0,Θ], there exists a pair of Nash equilibrium strategy in S1 ×S2 for
the game corresponding to the cost criterion (2).
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Proof: Given (µ,ν) ∈ S1 ×S2, H as defined in (34) can be proved to be a map with non-empty,
closed and convex values as in Theorem 1. Now, by Proposition 1, Lµ,ν{Xt, t≥ 0} is jointly contin-
uous in (µ,ν) ∈ S1×S2. Note that λˆ1[ν] as obtained in (28) has a minimizing stationary strategy
(30) and λˆ2[µ] as obtained in (29) has a minimizing stationary strategy (31), i.e., the minimiza-
tions in (28) and (29) can be effectively considered over S1 and S2 (resp.) which are compact sets.
Also, ri, i= 1,2 are bounded functions. Hence, by Berge Maximum Theorem (see Theorem 17.31
of Aliprantis and Border [7]), λˆ1[ν] and λˆ2[µ] are continuous in ν and µ respectively. Similarly,
the continuity of h∗1[ν] (resp. h
∗
2[µ]) follows from (72) (resp. (74)) and Lemma 2. Now consider
a sequence {(µk, νk)}k∈N in S1 × S2 converging to (µ∞, ν∞) ∈ S1 × S2. Let H(µk, νk) ∋ (µ˜k, ν˜k)→
(µ˜∞, ν˜∞) ∈ S1×S2. From the continuity of q(·|·, u, v), (h
∗
1[ν], λˆ1[ν]) and (h
∗
2[µ], λˆ2[µ]) in µ,ν, it fol-
lows that (µ˜∞, ν˜∞) ∈H(µ∞, ν∞). Hence the map H is upper semi-continuous. Then, by Theorem
1 of Fan [19], there exists a fixed point (µ∗, ν∗) :X 7→ P(U)×P(V ) of the map H defined as
(µ∗(k), ν∗(k))
def
= (µˆ[ν∗](k), νˆ[µ∗](k)) (79)
where µˆ[ν∗] (resp. νˆ[µ∗]) is any minimizing selector in (75) (resp. (77)). Then (µ∗, ν∗) ∈ S1×S2 is
a Nash equilibrium strategy for the cost criterion (2), i.e., for all k ∈X
λˆ1[ν
∗] = βµ
∗,ν∗
1 (θ, k)≤ β
µ,ν∗
1 (θ, k), ∀µ∈Π1,
and
λˆ2[µ
∗] = βµ
∗,ν∗
2 (θ, k)≤ β
µ∗,ν
2 (θ, k), ∀ν ∈Π2.
✷
5. Conclusions. We have established Nash equilibria for nonzero-sum discrete-time stochas-
tic games on a countable state space with risk-sensitive cost criteria. We have studied both dis-
counted and ergodic cost criteria on the infinite time horizon. For discounted cost criterion, we
have established Nash equilibria under fairly general conditions. For ergodic cost criterion, how-
ever, we have established our results under additional criteria of irreducibility (A1), stability (A2)
and smallness of cost (A3) all of which are standard in the corresponding literature. A natural
continuation of this work is to analyze such discrete-time games on general state spaces. Another
direction is to investigate such games in continuous time in the set-up of stochastic differential
games.
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